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This patch is limited to single-word replacements to fix spelling
and/or grammar to ease the review process. Punctuation and markdown
fixes are specifically excluded.
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The purpose of this flag is to allow the compiler to assume that each
object file passed to the linker has been compiled using a unique
source file name. This is useful for reducing link times when doing
ThinLTO in combination with whole-program devirtualization or CFI,
as it allows modules without exported symbols to be built with ThinLTO.
Reviewers: vitalybuka, teresajohnson
Reviewed By: teresajohnson
Pull Request: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/135728
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Kernel Control Flow Integrity (kCFI) is a feature that hardens indirect
calls by comparing a 32-bit hash of the function pointer's type against
a hash of the target function's type. If the hashes do not match, the
kernel may panic (or log the hash check failure, depending on the
kernel's configuration). These hashes are computed at compile time by
applying the xxHash64 algorithm to each mangled canonical function (or
function pointer) type, then truncating the result to 32 bits. This hash
is written into each indirect-callable function header by encoding it as
the 32-bit immediate operand to a `MOVri` instruction, e.g.:
```
__cfi_foo:
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
movl $199571451, %eax # hash of foo's type = 0xBE537FB
foo:
...
```
This PR extends x86-based kCFI with a 3-bit arity indicator encoded in
the `MOVri` instruction's register (reg) field as follows:
| Arity Indicator | Description | Encoding in reg field |
| --------------- | --------------- | --------------- |
| 0 | 0 parameters | EAX |
| 1 | 1 parameter in RDI | ECX |
| 2 | 2 parameters in RDI and RSI | EDX |
| 3 | 3 parameters in RDI, RSI, and RDX | EBX |
| 4 | 4 parameters in RDI, RSI, RDX, and RCX | ESP |
| 5 | 5 parameters in RDI, RSI, RDX, RCX, and R8 | EBP |
| 6 | 6 parameters in RDI, RSI, RDX, RCX, R8, and R9 | ESI |
| 7 | At least one parameter may be passed on the stack | EDI |
For example, if `foo` takes 3 register arguments and no stack arguments
then the `MOVri` instruction in its kCFI header would instead be written
as:
```
movl $199571451, %ebx # hash of foo's type = 0xBE537FB
```
This PR will benefit other CFI approaches that build on kCFI, such as
FineIBT. For example, this proposed enhancement to FineIBT must be able
to infer (at kernel init time) which registers are live at an indirect
call target: https://lkml.org/lkml/2024/9/27/982. If the arity bits are
available in the kCFI function header, then this information is trivial
to infer.
Note that there is another existing PR proposal that includes the 3-bit
arity within the existing 32-bit immediate field, which introduces
different security properties:
https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/117121.
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With D148785, -fsanitize=function no longer uses C++ RTTI objects and therefore
can support C. The rationale for reporting errors is C11 6.5.2.2p9:
> If the function is defined with a type that is not compatible with the type (of the expression) pointed to by the expression that denotes the called function, the behavior is undefined.
The mangled types approach we use does not exactly match the C type
compatibility (see `f(callee1)` below).
This is probably fine as the rules are unlikely leveraged in practice. In
addition, the call is warned by -Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict.
```
void callee0(int (*a)[]) {}
void callee1(int (*a)[1]) {}
void f(void (*fp)(int (*)[])) { fp(0); }
int main() {
int a[1];
f(callee0);
f(callee1); // compatible but flagged by -fsanitize=function, -fsanitize=kcfi, and -Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict
}
```
Skip indirect call sites of a function type without a prototype to avoid deal
with C11 6.5.2.2p6. -fsanitize=kcfi skips such calls as well.
Reviewed By: #sanitizers, vitalybuka
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D148827
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This commit adds a new option (i.e.,
`-fsanitize-cfi-icall-normalize-integers`) for normalizing integer types
as vendor extended types for cross-language LLVM CFI/KCFI support with
other languages that can't represent and encode C/C++ integer types.
Specifically, integer types are encoded as their defined representations
(e.g., 8-bit signed integer, 16-bit signed integer, 32-bit signed
integer, ...) for compatibility with languages that define
explicitly-sized integer types (e.g., i8, i16, i32, ..., in Rust).
``-fsanitize-cfi-icall-normalize-integers`` is compatible with
``-fsanitize-cfi-icall-generalize-pointers``.
This helps with providing cross-language CFI support with the Rust
compiler and is an alternative solution for the issue described and
alternatives proposed in the RFC
https://github.com/rust-lang/rfcs/pull/3296.
For more information about LLVM CFI/KCFI and cross-language LLVM
CFI/KCFI support for the Rust compiler, see the design document in the
tracking issue https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/89653.
Relands b1e9ab7438a098a18fecda88fc87ef4ccadfcf1e with fixes.
Reviewed By: pcc, samitolvanen
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D139395
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This reverts commit b1e9ab7438a098a18fecda88fc87ef4ccadfcf1e.
Reason: Looks like it broke the MSan buildbot, more details in the
phabricator review: https://reviews.llvm.org/D139395
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This commit adds a new option (i.e.,
`-fsanitize-cfi-icall-normalize-integers`) for normalizing integer types
as vendor extended types for cross-language LLVM CFI/KCFI support with
other languages that can't represent and encode C/C++ integer types.
Specifically, integer types are encoded as their defined representations
(e.g., 8-bit signed integer, 16-bit signed integer, 32-bit signed
integer, ...) for compatibility with languages that define
explicitly-sized integer types (e.g., i8, i16, i32, ..., in Rust).
``-fsanitize-cfi-icall-normalize-integers`` is compatible with
``-fsanitize-cfi-icall-generalize-pointers``.
This helps with providing cross-language CFI support with the Rust
compiler and is an alternative solution for the issue described and
alternatives proposed in the RFC
https://github.com/rust-lang/rfcs/pull/3296.
For more information about LLVM CFI/KCFI and cross-language LLVM
CFI/KCFI support for the Rust compiler, see the design document in the
tracking issue https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/89653.
Reviewed By: pcc, samitolvanen
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D139395
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The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Relands 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 with a fix for
32-bit builds.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
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This reverts commit 67504c95494ff05be2a613129110c9bcf17f6c13 as using
PointerEmbeddedInt to store 32 bits breaks 32-bit arm builds.
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The KCFI sanitizer, enabled with `-fsanitize=kcfi`, implements a
forward-edge control flow integrity scheme for indirect calls. It
uses a !kcfi_type metadata node to attach a type identifier for each
function and injects verification code before indirect calls.
Unlike the current CFI schemes implemented in LLVM, KCFI does not
require LTO, does not alter function references to point to a jump
table, and never breaks function address equality. KCFI is intended
to be used in low-level code, such as operating system kernels,
where the existing schemes can cause undue complications because
of the aforementioned properties. However, unlike the existing
schemes, KCFI is limited to validating only function pointers and is
not compatible with executable-only memory.
KCFI does not provide runtime support, but always traps when a
type mismatch is encountered. Users of the scheme are expected
to handle the trap. With `-fsanitize=kcfi`, Clang emits a `kcfi`
operand bundle to indirect calls, and LLVM lowers this to a
known architecture-specific sequence of instructions for each
callsite to make runtime patching easier for users who require this
functionality.
A KCFI type identifier is a 32-bit constant produced by taking the
lower half of xxHash64 from a C++ mangled typename. If a program
contains indirect calls to assembly functions, they must be
manually annotated with the expected type identifiers to prevent
errors. To make this easier, Clang generates a weak SHN_ABS
`__kcfi_typeid_<function>` symbol for each address-taken function
declaration, which can be used to annotate functions in assembly
as long as at least one C translation unit linked into the program
takes the function address. For example on AArch64, we might have
the following code:
```
.c:
int f(void);
int (*p)(void) = f;
p();
.s:
.4byte __kcfi_typeid_f
.global f
f:
...
```
Note that X86 uses a different preamble format for compatibility
with Linux kernel tooling. See the comments in
`X86AsmPrinter::emitKCFITypeId` for details.
As users of KCFI may need to locate trap locations for binary
validation and error handling, LLVM can additionally emit the
locations of traps to a `.kcfi_traps` section.
Similarly to other sanitizers, KCFI checking can be disabled for a
function with a `no_sanitize("kcfi")` function attribute.
Reviewed By: nickdesaulniers, kees, joaomoreira, MaskRay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D119296
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Use that for internal names (including the default ignorelists of the
sanitizers).
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D101832
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Expand the list of targets that support cfi-icall.
Add ThinLTO everywhere LTO is mentioned. AFAIK all CFI features are
supported with ThinLTO.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D87717
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The default behavior of Clang's indirect function call checker will replace
the address of each CFI-checked function in the output file's symbol table
with the address of a jump table entry which will pass CFI checks. We refer
to this as making the jump table `canonical`. This property allows code that
was not compiled with ``-fsanitize=cfi-icall`` to take a CFI-valid address
of a function, but it comes with a couple of caveats that are especially
relevant for users of cross-DSO CFI:
- There is a performance and code size overhead associated with each
exported function, because each such function must have an associated
jump table entry, which must be emitted even in the common case where the
function is never address-taken anywhere in the program, and must be used
even for direct calls between DSOs, in addition to the PLT overhead.
- There is no good way to take a CFI-valid address of a function written in
assembly or a language not supported by Clang. The reason is that the code
generator would need to insert a jump table in order to form a CFI-valid
address for assembly functions, but there is no way in general for the
code generator to determine the language of the function. This may be
possible with LTO in the intra-DSO case, but in the cross-DSO case the only
information available is the function declaration. One possible solution
is to add a C wrapper for each assembly function, but these wrappers can
present a significant maintenance burden for heavy users of assembly in
addition to adding runtime overhead.
For these reasons, we provide the option of making the jump table non-canonical
with the flag ``-fno-sanitize-cfi-canonical-jump-tables``. When the jump
table is made non-canonical, symbol table entries point directly to the
function body. Any instances of a function's address being taken in C will
be replaced with a jump table address.
This scheme does have its own caveats, however. It does end up breaking
function address equality more aggressively than the default behavior,
especially in cross-DSO mode which normally preserves function address
equality entirely.
Furthermore, it is occasionally necessary for code not compiled with
``-fsanitize=cfi-icall`` to take a function address that is valid
for CFI. For example, this is necessary when a function's address
is taken by assembly code and then called by CFI-checking C code. The
``__attribute__((cfi_jump_table_canonical))`` attribute may be used to make
the jump table entry of a specific function canonical so that the external
code will end up taking a address for the function that will pass CFI checks.
Fixes PR41972.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D65629
llvm-svn: 368495
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Differential revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D56946
llvm-svn: 351976
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llvm-svn: 346101
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Similarly to CFI on virtual and indirect calls, this implementation
tries to use program type information to make the checks as precise
as possible. The basic way that it works is as follows, where `C`
is the name of the class being defined or the target of a call and
the function type is assumed to be `void()`.
For virtual calls:
- Attach type metadata to the addresses of function pointers in vtables
(not the functions themselves) of type `void (B::*)()` for each `B`
that is a recursive dynamic base class of `C`, including `C` itself.
This type metadata has an annotation that the type is for virtual
calls (to distinguish it from the non-virtual case).
- At the call site, check that the computed address of the function
pointer in the vtable has type `void (C::*)()`.
For non-virtual calls:
- Attach type metadata to each non-virtual member function whose address
can be taken with a member function pointer. The type of a function
in class `C` of type `void()` is each of the types `void (B::*)()`
where `B` is a most-base class of `C`. A most-base class of `C`
is defined as a recursive base class of `C`, including `C` itself,
that does not have any bases.
- At the call site, check that the function pointer has one of the types
`void (B::*)()` where `B` is a most-base class of `C`.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D47567
llvm-svn: 335569
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llvm-svn: 334671
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These were true at one point but haven't been true for a long time.
llvm-svn: 334669
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llvm-svn: 329942
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Summary:
This change allows generalizing pointers in type signatures used for
cfi-icall by enabling the -fsanitize-cfi-icall-generalize-pointers flag.
This works by 1) emitting an additional generalized type signature
metadata node for functions and 2) llvm.type.test()ing for the
generalized type for translation units with the flag specified.
This flag is incompatible with -fsanitize-cfi-cross-dso because it would
require emitting twice as many type hashes which would increase artifact
size.
Reviewers: pcc, eugenis
Reviewed By: pcc
Subscribers: kcc
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D39358
llvm-svn: 317044
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Summary:
This is the follow-up patch to D37924.
This change refactors clang to use the the newly added section headers
in SpecialCaseList to specify which sanitizers blacklists entries
should apply to, like so:
[cfi-vcall]
fun:*bad_vcall*
[cfi-derived-cast|cfi-unrelated-cast]
fun:*bad_cast*
The SanitizerSpecialCaseList class has been added to allow querying by
SanitizerMask, and SanitizerBlacklist and its downstream users have been
updated to provide that information. Old blacklists not using sections
will continue to function identically since the blacklist entries will
be placed into a '[*]' section by default matching against all
sanitizers.
Reviewers: pcc, kcc, eugenis, vsk
Reviewed By: eugenis
Subscribers: dberris, cfe-commits, mgorny
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D37925
llvm-svn: 314171
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I have updated the compiler-rt tests.
llvm-svn: 267903
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It makes compiler-rt tests fail if the gold plugin is enabled.
Revert "Rework interface for bitset-using features to use a notion of LTO visibility."
Revert "Driver: only produce CFI -fvisibility= error when compiling."
Revert "clang/test/CodeGenCXX/cfi-blacklist.cpp: Exclude ms targets. They would be non-cfi."
llvm-svn: 267871
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Bitsets, and the compiler features they rely on (vtable opt, CFI),
only have visibility within the LTO'd part of the linkage unit. Therefore,
only enable these features for classes with hidden LTO visibility. This
notion is based on object file visibility or (on Windows)
dllimport/dllexport attributes.
We provide the [[clang::lto_visibility_public]] attribute to override the
compiler's LTO visibility inference in cases where the class is defined
in the non-LTO'd part of the linkage unit, or where the ABI supports
calling classes derived from abstract base classes with hidden visibility
in other linkage units (e.g. COM on Windows).
If the cross-DSO CFI mode is enabled, bitset checks are emitted even for
classes with public LTO visibility, as that mode uses a separate mechanism
to cause bitsets to be exported.
This mechanism replaces the whole-program-vtables blacklist, so remove the
-fwhole-program-vtables-blacklist flag.
Because __declspec(uuid()) now implies [[clang::lto_visibility_public]], the
support for the special attr:uuid blacklist entry is removed.
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D18635
llvm-svn: 267784
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Also restore Makefile.sphinx which is needed to build the documentation.
llvm-svn: 259382
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Clang-side cross-DSO CFI.
* Adds a command line flag -f[no-]sanitize-cfi-cross-dso.
* Links a runtime library when enabled.
* Emits __cfi_slowpath calls is bitset test fails.
* Emits extra hash-based bitsets for external CFI checks.
* Sets a module flag to enable __cfi_check generation during LTO.
This mode does not yet support diagnostics.
llvm-svn: 255694
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llvm-svn: 255393
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Use proper headling levels in CFI doc. Before that, all sections
were considered a subsection of "Introduction".
Reviewers: pcc, kcc
Subscribers: cfe-commits
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D15237
llvm-svn: 254771
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This flag causes the compiler to emit bit set entries for functions as well
as runtime bitset checks at indirect call sites. Depends on the new function
bitset mechanism.
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D11857
llvm-svn: 247238
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We now use the sanitizer special case list to decide which types to blacklist.
We also support a special blacklist entry for types with a uuid attribute,
which are generally COM types whose virtual tables are defined externally.
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D11096
llvm-svn: 242286
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Summary:
This is unfortunate, but would let us land http://reviews.llvm.org/D10467,
that makes ToolChains responsible for computing the set of sanitizers
they support.
Unfortunately, Darwin ToolChains doesn't know about actual OS they
target until ToolChain::TranslateArgs() is called. In particular, it
means we won't be able to construct SanitizerArgs for these ToolChains
before that.
This change removes SanitizerArgs::needsLTO() method, so that now
ToolChain::IsUsingLTO(), which is called very early, doesn't need
SanitizerArgs to implement this method.
Docs and test cases are updated accordingly. See
https://llvm.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=23539, which describes why we
start all these.
Test Plan: regression test suite
Reviewers: pcc
Subscribers: cfe-commits
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D10560
llvm-svn: 240170
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This uses the same class metadata currently used for virtual call and
cast checks.
The new flag is -fsanitize=cfi-nvcall. For consistency, the -fsanitize=cfi-vptr
flag has been renamed -fsanitize=cfi-vcall.
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D8756
llvm-svn: 233874
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This scheme checks that pointer and lvalue casts are made to an object of
the correct dynamic type; that is, the dynamic type of the object must be
a derived class of the pointee type of the cast. The checks are currently
only introduced where the class being casted to is a polymorphic class.
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D8312
llvm-svn: 232241
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This patch introduces the -fsanitize=cfi-vptr flag, which enables a control
flow integrity scheme that checks that virtual calls take place using a vptr of
the correct dynamic type. More details in the new docs/ControlFlowIntegrity.rst
file.
It also introduces the -fsanitize=cfi flag, which is currently a synonym for
-fsanitize=cfi-vptr, but will eventually cover all CFI checks implemented
in Clang.
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D7424
llvm-svn: 230055
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